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Abstract A linear quadratic differential game in which the system is affected by additive as well as 
multiplicative disturbances and both players have access to the same noisy measurements is olved. Using 
the concept of projection estimates, the problem is reduced to a completely observable one and the optimal 
linear nonanticipative strategy is found via a deterministic Hamiltonqacobi Bellman-Isaacs theory. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A two-person pursuit-evasion differential game is considered in which the system is disturbed by 
additive and multiplicative noises. Both the pursuer and the evader know the system characteristics 
and have access to the same noisy measurements. The case with only additive noise in the system 
has been extensively studied. A good reference is [1] where other works are cited. Earlier, Luk and 
Maguiraga[2] considered ifferential games with state-dependent and control-dependent noises. 
However, the state of the game was assumed to be completely observable. The case of partially 
observable state is more difficult and has not been investigated. The method used for solving such 
kind of problem is to reduce it to a completely observable one with the state space being the 
conditional mean or the unnormalized conditional measure. The main difficulty of this approach 
is that, in general, the resulting completely observable system is infinite dimensional. In this article 
we choose the optimal linear estimate ~k of the state xk, as the state of the resulting completely 
observable system. The orthogonal property of-'~k plays an essential role in carrying out this 
reduction. 
In Section 2, we formulate the problem and in Section 3 we introduce the class of linear 
nonanticipative strategies. The filtering equation for the optimal linear estimate is derived in 
Section 4 while Section 5 is concerned with the reduction of the original game problem to an 
equivalent game with complete information in the state. Furthermore, optimal closed loop 
strategies i obtained via a deterministic Bellman-Isaacs equation approach. 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We consider the following two-person pursuit-evasion stochastic differential game. Let a 
probability space (fl, P, ~)  be given. The state x, of the game is a stochastic process on (fl, P, d )  
satisfying the following bilinear Ito equation: 
dx, = A,x, dt + Gi,ul,d, + G2,u2,d, + B,x, dvt (1) 
where utand u~ denote strategies of the two players. 
The information pattern of the game is that the same observation y, satisfying the equation: 
dy, = C,x, dt + RI ~ dw,, (2) 
is available to both players. In the above setting, x,, y,, u~, and u2, are respectively of dimension 
n, m, pt, and P2. v, and w, are assumed to be independent Wiener processes of dimension I and 
m respectively. R] '2 is a m x m positive definite matrix. The random initial condition x, is assumed 
to be independent of v, and w,. Finally, it is assumed that A,, B,, G~,, Gz,, C, and R, are deterministic 
matrices with the appropriate dimensions. 
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Further restrictions on the strategies i  required. For fixed T > 0, let the class U of admissible 
strategies be those linear nonanticipative strategies u, based on the observations y~, s ~< a ~ t. In 
other words, strategies u, are of the form 
f/ ~,+ /~(t .a)dy~ (3) 
where ~,, fl(t, a)  are deterministic functions such that 
<OC 
~ ~.t1".tlfl2(1, a)do-dl <~.  (fl,~)=fl, i= ,  . . . . .  p, 
.j = 1 . . . . .  m 
(the index p stands for pj or P2)- 
Finally, the game is assumed to be a zero sum one with the following quadratic payoff function: 
J(s, x,. u I , u2) = E [x;Q,x, + ui, Nn,ul, t~,N2,u2, ] d l+  Ex~.Dx 7 (4) 
where Q,, D are nonnegative definite matrices and Nt ,  N2, are positive definite. It is assumed that 
Q,, D, Nj, and N2, are deterministic. 
We wish to search for admissible strategies u*, u* such that 
J(s. x s, u*, u2) ~ J(s, x,, u*, u*)  <~ J(s, &. Un. u*) Vu,, u.,. ~ U. 
Remarks  
(1) The methods presented in this paper can be extended to treat the case that the noise term 
of the state equation is of the form 
d 
E B i .V~ dr'# 
i I 
where r,, are independent scalar Wiener processes and are independent of w,. 
(2) For the purpose of simple notation we will occasionally omit the subscript t from the 
coefficients A,. G,, B,, etc. 
3. L INEAR NONANTIC IPAT IVE  STRATEGIES  
Let u~, u~ be two linear nonanticipative strategies entering in (l). Let us write 
Let 
l,!lt ~- 3{it -~- 
~t 1 
IdZt ~ 9{2t -}- j ,  
f ' [ J r{t .  a ) d.r~ 
fl2( t. c; ) dye. (5) 
f' i' x , /= {/}(t, s)Ex, + @(t. a)G~,u~, do + cl}(t, a)G~,u~, da 
where @(t, s) is the transition matrix of A. 
Then, we define 
.7~ = y, ~j/('..\{). do-. 
By (5) and (6) we can write (7) in the form 
| ' ,  -~-17 t -~ ]1, "q- (',r(l)((J ", t] )(6"l, l[] l( I  l, C )q -  G2,1/]2(rl, ~ )) d~l dy da 
where h, is a deterministic function whose explicit expression is omitted for simplicity. 
(6) 
(7) 
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With a technique from the theory of Volterra integral equation (e.g. [3]) we can solve y,, s ~< cr ~< t
in terms of )7, s ~< a ~< t 07~ + h~): 
y ,= ~,+ H(a ,  tl) d~, da p.-a.s. (8) 
where HcL2([s, T) x [s, T]) is the resolvent kernel of the kernel 
tl)(G,~ G2, 
(The explicit form of H can be found but for simplicity it is omitted.) 
It follows from (5) and (8) that linear nonanticipative strategies u~, u2 can also be expressed as 
a nonanticipative linear functional of )-7 s ~< ~r ~< t. 
4. F ILTERING EQUATION FOR THE OPT IMAL  L INEAR EST IMATE 
The appearance of the strategies in the state equation complicates the structure of the state 
equation• We proceed in the following way to derive an equation for the optimal linear estimate 
of x,, based on the informations y~, s ~< cr ~< t. First we reduce (1) and (2) to a system without 
strategies, and find out an appropr iate stimate• We then convert the estimate back to determine 
the equation satisfied by the optimal linear estimate of x,. 
Let It,, p,,, p,. denote measures on e[s, t] induced by processes v~, w~, y~, on [s, t] respectively. 
Let E[x,[y,] denote the conditional mean of  x,, conditioning on y, = {y~, s ~< a ~< t}. Then, from 
the theory of stochastic equation and from Bayes formula (cf. [4. 5]), 
[ (; '; )l E,,.c,.)×,~ w x, exp x'~C'R ldy~-~ x'~C'R-ICx~da lY,
E[x,I yt] = (9) 
Let us define 
E (f' E~,,.<,.) ~ ,~.c,.) exp s 
-~t ~ Xt  - -  Xot 
Then x,, y, satisfy 
d.f, = A.¢, dt + B:g dr, 
d)7, = C£, dt + R 1:2 dw,. 
Note that x, still appears in (1 1). This raises some difficulty. 
By (10) and (9) can be written as 
E[x, ly,] - E,, (v)[5,A,] + x, , , - "  a,(~,) 
E,,, (v)[A,] a,(1) _ - -  + x0t 
where 
A,: exp 5"~C'R ~dF, - I  ' = .7".C'R IC£~der 
and ¢r,(l) is the Radon N ikodym derivative dp~/dp.. 
By Ito's formula A, satisfies 
f A,I + Aj '~C"R l dF,. 
Therefore 
o, (1)= I + E,,,,,[Ao.~;C'R ' ]d .~o= I + E,,,,,.~[5;C'R ' ]d~ 
;? + tr E~,,c,.~[A~R~21C~2.g~_~'~tC'~, R , ~ ] d F.  d fr;2 
(lo) 
( i i )  
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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g 'C  °, , 
- -1+ tr j ,  j, R;~ C..E[Y.~.g'~,]C'~ R;i 'dy. dy'~e 
+ tr R. 'C. :  {E,,.,,.,[.g~;e'~,A.e ] 
- E,,,..,. ,,,, (F)[.e~fi=;, A. .  ]}C;,  Ro,' d.F~, d iv;. (16) 
t 
o,(x,) = L;.,.,[e,] + E.,,,~[..Le;C'R ~A~] dL  
£ f = q)(t, o) E[.eo.g;]C'R ' d.fL + 4,(t, o) [E,,,,,.,[.e~,EAA 
--£],,o.,×,.07)[.ff..ff'oA.]}C'~R ' dy , .  17) 
The two remainder terms in (16) and (17) are respectively orthogonal to iterated integrals with 
respect to d f  of lower orders, under the measure p,,(y). It follows that, since o,(1) is the 
Radon N ikodym derivative dt~7/d/&., if the optimal first order estimate .~', of  2-, is denoted by 
f, 'h ( t , )  d.F. O 
then b(t, a) satisfies the following Wiener Hopf  integral equation: 
f: 4)(t, z) E[Y,.g;]C;R; 1 = h([. "c) -~ b(t, a)CoE[.~,Y;]C;R; I do- S ~ "t" ~ t. 18) 
This implies that 
7b( t , r )=[A , -b ( t , z ) ]b ( t , r )  s ~<r ~<t. 19) 
c,t 
From (18) we have, for v = t, 
t 
b(t , t )=E[x,x~]C;R,  ' -  b(t, cr)C,E[Z,.~;]C;R, 'da 
= s[.e, - .¢,][ .e, - g l '  C; R, '= :  ;,,C; R, ' 
It follows from (19) and (20) that 
; £ &~,=d b( t .o )dy~=[A, -b ( t . t )C , ]  b ( t ,a )dy~dt  +b( t , t )dy ,  
= A,.~, dt + y, C; RS~ [d g , -  c,~, dt] = A,.¢c, d t+ 7, C; R, l [dy , -  C,2, dt] 
where 
2,: = ~, + x0,. 
It follows that -(3 satisfies the following equation: 
d_(', = A.;:, d t+ (if Ul, d l+  G2u2, dt + 7,C'R ~ [d)', - C.(', dr] 
with 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
.(, = Ex,. 
From the optimality of ~, and that linear nonanticipative strategies Ul, u2 can be expressed as 
linear functional of 7~. s ~ a <~ t. we have that 2, is the optimal linear estimate of x, conditioning 
on .v,, s ~< a ~< t. From (11) and (21), we have that 7, satisfies the following equation: 
);, = 7,A" + AT, -- 7,C'R JCT, + BEx, x~B'. (23) 
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5. OPTIMAL LINEAR NONANTICIPATIVE STRATEGIES 
In this section, optimal law of closed loop strategies will be derived via a deterministic 
Bellman-Isaacs equation approach. By the optimality of ~, the payoff unction J can be computed 
as follows: 
x~, ui, u2) = E j f + u'ltN1 ul, __ u~,N2uz,] dt + Ex'rDxr 
;7 = E [2rQ2, + u'~,N,u,,- u;,N2u2, + trQy,]dt + E2'rD2r + trDTr (24) 
where 7, = E(x,-  2,)(x,- 2,)' satisfies (23). 
By the optimality of 2, the term E2,2~ in (23) can be written as Ex, x~ = E2,2~ + 7,. 
Our aim is to reduce the original differential game problem to an equivalent game problem of 
which the information of the state is completely available. We need the following theorem. 
Theorem 5.1 
Let 3, be a process which satisfies the equation 
d~, =f(t, 4) dt + g(t, 4) dff, 
where 
d~7,: = R-Ii2(dy,- CYc, dt). 
Then for any smooth scalar function 46(~) the following Ito's formula holds: 
46(~,) = 46(~s)+ -~¢+ dr + \tg~.]g(z, ¢)d~g, (25) 
where 
Thus 
, ¢ , /&46" , , '  
In particular, if g is independent of 3, f i s  linear in 4, and 46 is of the quadratic polynomial form 
'K~ + b'~ + e, then 
£[ E46 (~,) = E46 (¢,) + E 5'~' 46 + ~-z dr. (26) 
Proof 
We assume that f and g are sufficiently well behaved. Let us rewrite d~, as 
d~V, = R = ~.'2(dy, - Cic, dt) = R-laC(x,-  .%) dt + dw,. 
Define 
7; 1 -=exp (x-2, ) 'C 'R ' /2d~,- l f ' (x~-2~) 'C 'R 'C (x~- .%)da " 2J,,. 
and let fi be the measure given by dP, = z,dP,. Under/~ by Girsanov theorem ~, becomes a Wiener 
process. Hence, by Ito's formula we have 
f [ I  &hi ft(c746Ygd~,_a.s" (27) ¢(~,)=46(~)+ ~CP,46 +~-z dr +L \ tgv / /  
Since 6 ~ p, (27) also holds P-a.s. This proves (25). Now if 46 is of the quadratic form and 3, is 
a linear process, then by the orthogonal property of 2, we have 
f' \~T} g d~ = O. 
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This proves (26). 
By applying Theorem 5.1 to the matrix function -f,Si, we have 
d2,2 ~ = [2,2;A" + A2,2;] dt + [2,u'~,G ~ + Gju~,/c; + 5c, u~,G'2 + G2u2,2 ~ 
+ DC'R IC7,]dt +-¢c,d~7~R I/2Cytq- )'tC'R I/2dff,2'. 
Let us define v, = E2,2~. Then 
f, = v,A' + Av, + E[2,uI,G{ + G~u.,2~ + £c,u~,G~ + Geu2,2~] + LC'R ~C7,. (28) 
We can now formulate the following completely observable game problem which is equivalent 
to the original one: 
min max J(s, 2,, v,, y,, u~, u2) 
uleU u2e~ 
=E [2;Q2,+u~,NlU, , -u; ,Nau2,+trQy,]dt+E2'rD2r+trDTr (29) 
subject to 
);, = 7tA' + Ay, + By,B" - 7, C'R tCT, + Bv, B' 
f, = v,A' + Av, + E[2,uI,G; + G,u~,2; + .f,u~,G; + G2u2,2,] + 7,C'R 
d.¢c, = A.¢c, dt + Gtu,, dt + G2u:, dt + 7,C'R ~[dy,-  C2, dt] 
with initial conditions 2~ = Ex 2, v~ = Ex~x~, 7~ = E(x , -  Ex,)(X, - EX,)'. 
Remark 
~C7, 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
Theorem 5.2 
Suppose that there exists a smooth scalar deterministic function W(s, v, 7) satisfies the following 
equation 
O= inf E [  A~'~ W +?~W ,,~L21n.pO ~ + L~""~-(s, v. y) 
= sup [A~t '~w+~W+L~t '~ ' - ( s ,v ,y ) ]  
u2eL2(~,p2) (~S 
. .  OW . .  
=E  A~,'"'- W+~s +L"t'"2(s,v, 7) (33) 
for some u*eL2(fL  p,), u*eL2(~L P2) where L2(fL p~) (i = 1, 2) are the spaces of L -~ random 
variables of dimensions Pl and p> respectively, and satisfies the boundary condition 
W(T, v, 7) = trvD + trvD 
where 
where 
L .... 2(s, v, Y): = trvQ, + trTQ.~ + u~NL,.u. -- u~N,,u2 
A~ '"2" = tr[TA~ + A~7 + B.#B; -- 7C~R,7~C# + &vB;] ?~ 
? 
+ tr[vA( + A.,v + 2u;G~., + GL, u~2" + xu;G;~ + G2,u22 + yC;R, 'C,7]/?v 
v: = E.f.f', 2eL2(~q,n) 
?, is an n x nnonnegat ive  definite matr ix.  
With the introduction of v, the J(s, £c~, v+, L, u,, u2) can be regarded as independent of 2,. Thus 
we can write it as J(s, v~, 7~, ul, u2) with 2, omitted. 
it is of  interest to notice that the game problem (29)-(32) is not really of stochastic type in the 
sense that we have the following verification theorem of a deterministic form. 
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Then, if u*,, u*, are admissible strategies uch that 
E[  A'/*''':' W(t' v*' 7* **  1 )+~- (t, v*, 7") + LU""-~' (t, v*,7*) 
1 = sup E A, '''~: W(t, v* "*) c~W ~,~L'-~n,,.) ' ' ~"  + ~ (t, V*, 7*) + L";"": (t, v,*. 7*5) 
= inf E A~"~*,W(t ,v* ,7 , )+~7(t ,v* ,7 ,*)+L" l '~v(t ,  *, V*) =0.  
u I~L2(~,p  I ) 
where v*, 7* are solutions of (30) and (31) corresponding to u*,, u~',. Then u~',, u~', are optimal 
strategies, i.e. 
J (s ,v,  7, u~,u2)~J (s ,v ,  7, u~,u~)<.~J(s,v,  7  u l ,u~) Vul, u2~U 
and 
u* u*~ - W(s, v, 7). J(s, v, a, 2, ,~ *
Proof 
From (33) we have, for each ul~L2([2, Pt), 
[ • -E  A~"u~W ~-s j<-.El~l'~2(s,v, 7). 
It follows that, for each admissible strategies u~,, by the chain rule, 
<<. W(T, v r, 7r) + E L "'~'u~' (t, v,, 7,) dt = J(s, v, 7, ul, u*) 
where v,, 7, are trajectories of (30) and (31) with strategies ul,, u*, and initial data v, 7. 
On the other hand, for u*, we have 
-E  A u,~,u2, W + -~ (t, v*, 7*) = EL ~'''"-~' (t, v*, 7*). 
Therefore 
f;[ ] W(s, v, 7) W(T, * * ~',,'u2, t3W t, = Vr ,T r ) -E  A " * W( t ,V* ,T t* )+~-(  vt*,?,*) dt 
= W(t ,v ,* ,7*)+E L"r,'u~,(t,v*,y*)dt =J(s,v,  7, u*,u*). 
,,Is 
Thus we have 
Similarly 
J(s, v, 7, u*, u*) = W(s, v, 7) <~ J(s, v, 7, u*, u*). 
J(s, v, 7, tt*, u*) ~ W(s, v, 7) = J(s, v, 7, u*, u*). 
This completes the proof. 
Now we seek a solution to the Bellman-Isaacs equation (33) and to find the admissible optimal 
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strategies. We have 
E[ °W ] 
L ~ t +AT"""W+L"""2(t'v, 7) 
(~t + tr[yA; + At7 + BrTB;- 7C;R, 'C,7 + B, vB;] ~ + tr[vA; + A,v + iu;G;, 
, ~ 0 W t +Gitutyc,+.;cu2G2,+Gz,u>~,+TC, R/ tl7]~.v +trvQ,+tr7Q2+u;Ni,ul-u~N~,u 2 . (34) 
J 
It follows from the theory of variational inequality [6] that for each fixed t, f .  7, and v : = E.~.'~', 
saddle point occurs at 
(~W 
OW 
U 2 = N2t  I G2t ~-.~. (35) 
Since (~W/c~v is of deterministic value, strategies of the form (35) are admissible when _-~ is replaced 
by .f,. Substitute (35) into (34) and setting (34) equal to zero, we obtain 
(?W ~ ~?W 
- -+t r [TA[+A,7+B,  yB[-) ,C'R ~CT+BvB'] +tr [vA'+Av+),C 'R ~C7] 
Ot (,v 
~)W ~ OW (?W ?W 
- trV~v G;' (~Jv ~ ~G~tN2~lG'~trvQ'+tr)'Q'=O'" - (~v  (36) 
This is a partial differential equation of the first order with boundary data W(T, v, 7)= 
trvD + trTD for all nonnegative definite v 7,. 
We now apply the method of characteristics to solve (36). From [7], the characteristic equations 
of (36) are 
7,= TtA' + A~, + BTtB' - 7tC'R ICy, + Bv, B' 
f, = vt[A'-  Kt(GjN;-'G~ - G2N2'G~)] + [A - (G~Ni-'G; + G2N2 'G2)]v, + vtC'R 'C;,~ 
3~,= -MtA  -A 'Mt -  B'M,B +C'R tCvtM , + M,TC'R ~C 
-C 'R  'CT,K,- K ,7 ,C 'R - 'C -Q 
Kr = - K,A - A'K, + K,[G,N,]GI - GN- ~G2]J, -B 'M,B  - Q (37) 
with the boundary conditions 
7,=7, v~.=v and Kr=D, Mr=D 
where we denote 6W/07 by M, and (?W/(~v by K,, when ~W/(~y and c~W/(?v evaluate along the 
characteristics. If for each boundary data solution of (37) exists on Is, T], then by the method of 
characteristics we can construct a twice continuous (w.r.t. v and 7) function W satisfying (36) via 
the solutions of (37). Consequently optimal strategies exists and is of the form (35) with :~ replaced 
by ~, and (?W/(?v by K~. To prove the existence of (37) on Is, T], let us assume the following 
condition: 
there exists a positive definite matrix N and matrix G such that 
GtNi IG~-G2N21G~=GN IG'. (38) 
With assumption (38), let us consider the following optimal control problem: 
min tr[v,Q + LQ + F, NF~] dt + trvr D + trTrD (39) 
Ft~L2[~', 7] .~ 
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subject to 
/,--=7,A + AT,+ BT, B ' - ; ,C  R ICTr+ Bv, B' 
~, = (A + GF,)v, + v,(A + GF)' + 7, C 'R ~C7, (40) 
with initial data being those nonnegative definite matrices v, 7. 
By an existence theorem (e.g. [8, Chap. II I , Corol lary 4.1]) optimal control F* of  the control 
problem (39), (40) exists. It follows from Pontryagin's maximum principle that there exists K*, M* 
satisfying the following equation (where v*, 7* are the trajectories corresponding to F*): 
F* =-U ,  'G;K* 
";'* = 7*A'  + AT* + BT*B ' -  7*C'R 'C7" + Bv*B' 
~;* = (A ~- GF*)v* + v*(A + GF*)' + 7*C'R 'C7" 
~ I*= -M*A - A 'M* -  B 'M*B +C'R  'CT*M* + M*v*C 'R  'C 
-- C 'R  'CT*K* -  K*7*C 'R  ' - Q 
I~* = -K*A  -- A 'K*  + K*GN 'G'K* - B 'M*B - Q (41) 
with boundary data 7* = 7, v ,  = v; and K* = D, M* = D. Since (41) is the same as (37) the 
existence of solution of  (37) is thus proved. In summary, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem (separation principle) 
With assumption (38), the optimal strategies u*,, u*, of  the game problem (1)-(4) exists and is 
of  the form 
ul, = - N i,IG ~,K,£c, 
U2, = N2i 1G2,K,£c, 
where K, is one of the components of  the solution of  (37) and x, is the optimal linear estimate of 
x, satisfying the filtering equation (22). 
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